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RICH COUNTY, UTAH, 
Defendant. 
LI'wlvHY"'"t, Rich County, 
Case No. CV~02-00072 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL 
VERDiCT FORM 
by and through undersigned counsel, submits their 
proposed jury "''''<AU.U'' pursuant to LR.C.P. 51. further, the Defendant requests to offer 
/0 
llll /:::01) 1'BU 1 ~:3 
,,$ may, during course 
the case to the on 
form. " 
A 






",,,r,u,,,"'''' (l r the court; 
nrnUlnf',. of the jury; 
4 statements 0 r counsel arc not 
5 by counsel not to influence the 
6 review ""''';'''11''''' COl11Uleu to 
II impeachment; 
12 reaching a 
13 llelec.:ting a foreman; and 
14 communications with the court. 









,u,u,,,",,,,,u hereto. to l.R.C.P. 5 1 (a)(1), the originals contain a blank for 







A Homeys for Defendant 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPEC1AL VERDICT FORM 
J 
H/l ~! ZOO THU lZt 32 
OF SERVICE 
r HEREBY CERTIFY that on th1s day of November, 2009 I caused to be 
a true copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM by the method indicated below, to the following: 
Craig R. Jorgensen, 
Attorney at Law 
1246 Yellowstone Avenue, Suite A4 
P.O. Box 4904 
Pocatello j lD 83205·4904 
Attorney for Plaintiff,:) 
Alan Johnston 
W. PIKE & 
t 51 North Rldge 
P.O. Box 
Idaho Falls, 10 
Defendants 
() U,S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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()~ghtMaH 
(1"Facsimile 
( ) lJ.S. Mail, Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) might 
( ) u. S. Mail, 
( ) Hand Delivered 













1 t/ /:,009 'fHO 12: 
KYLEATHAY. 
Plainti No. CV-02-00072 
v. SPECIAL 
RlCH COUNTY, UTAH, 
jury, answer questions bmltte:d to us in as 
NO. 1. 
QUESTION NO.2. 
plaintiff s injuries? 
Yes No 
If you have 
questions, If Y01.1 
cause 
both 
ff act with Ii "' ... iTrnli while 
conduct, if any, fa proxi (Illite Gause of 
above questions "Yes," then please answer the next two 
of the questiorL"l "No," you will not answer rem<'!lning 










If you answered 'No! to 




(c) County Sheriff's 
(d) Ie Athay 
VERDICT 
8. 
of Kyle Athay 
4,5 6, yOll should not answer 
a zero (0) 
8 
must total 100%. 












(g) Wyoming Downs 
100 




11/L9/2009 7HU 1::;, F'AX 
13 
1! I 0 0 ~ ~'[1 U 1 
NO. 
Plaintl ff Kyle Athay claims that Rich County} Utah, is liable for the damages the plaintlff 
allegedly suffered as a result or a vehicle collision between Ky le Athay and Daryl Emn on June 
10, 1999 Mr. Ervin was being pursued by Sheriff Stacey and Bear Lake County Deputies 
Gregg Athay and Chad Ludwig. 
In aelemiC, Rich County claims it is not liable because Sheriff Stacey with 
during the incident and Sheriil' 
not a proximate cause of plaintiffs alleged damages. 
11/l9! 0 :1'flO 3 lOS:'! 
statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence -in this case. I 
advised you of the of Llie parties merely to acquaint you the issues to 
lL/19 00 :l'BU 
INSTRUCTION NO. 








11/1!i! ZO()9 3) 
that 
Gregg and/or 
were the burden of proving each of the follovdng 
1. That the plaintiff, Daryl Ervin, Deputy Gregg Athay and/or Deputy Chad Ludwig 
2. That the negligence of plaintiff, Daryl Ervin, Deputy Gregg Athay and/or Deputy 
Chad LudVJig was a proximate cause ofthe injury and damage claimed tD have been suffered by 
In 
tl / :5 /0 
.mRY INSTRUCTION NO. 
\\Then r that a party has the burden of proof on a propositio~ or use the expression "if 
you find" or you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably 
111le than not true. 
11/1 .' 2009 2'[)U 1 ,34 
( 
5 
When I use 
probable sequence, 
II proximate cause," I mean a canse 
complained injury, loss or damage, 
in or 
but that cause Lhe 
damage would not have occurred. Tl need not the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a 
substantia! factor in bringing about the irdury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if tbe 
injury, loss or damage Hkely would have occurred anyway_ 
There one or more proximate causes of an inj ury. When conduct 
two or more contributes as substantial factors in an injury, 
cause the extent to 
35/082 
11/ 91:::00~ TflU 1 FhX /0 
.JURY INSTRUCTION 
that VU'c'H.u,,n~G in course conduct. 
In 
/1 /2 O~ 37/1) 
I use word in these I mean 
care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean 
reasonably l::areful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by 
Negligence may thus of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful 
person would do, or doing of something a reasonably careful person would 110t dQ, under 
to those by The law not say lio',,- a 
careful act is for to 
11/U!2QO THU L 3 
NO. 
A violation of a statute is negligence, unless (1) compliance with the statute ',vas 
impossible, or (2) something over which the party had no control placed him a pmaucm 
violation of the statute, or (3) an emergency not ofthc: palty's own making him Lo fail to 
the statute or an excuse specifically provlded within the statute existed 
In 
11/1 /200 'reu 12135 
I 
J 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
The: statlltes of the state ofTdaho state that it is un1<l\wul for any person who i$ under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs OT any other intoxicating substances to drive (IT in actual 
control of a motor vehicle within ihis !itate. 
:3 /0 :2 
The statutes state that upon immediate 
"rn",rn .. n,'" or police lIse of an audible or visible signal, driver 
must yield the right-of-way and immediately drive to a paranel to, and as 
as possible to, the nearest or curb of the highway lawflll for parking and clear of any 
intersection, and stop and remain in that position until the authorized emergency or police 
vehicle has P""''''"'''', except when otherwise directed by a peace officer. 
0/0 :'. 
other 
11/ 9! loEl 
JURY NO. 
statutes stale ofIdaho state that no person shall drive amotor vehicle at such a 
slow as to impede the nomlaJ reasonable movement traft1c 
is or law. 
3 
1/ I 0 ~ 
A 
when, as a 
mental abilities are impaired to the 
vehicle with the caution 
circumstances. 
NO. 
is under the influence of [an intoxicating [a 
beveragel [using a drug], the dnver'i; physical or 
that the driver no longer has the capacity to drive a 
a sober person of ordinary prudence similar 





1 '1! / :l Q C 'CH U 
INSTRUCTION 
statutes sta1e of Idaho state that every driver of a vehicle due 
care to avoid colliding with any or ,In)' person propelling a hllrnan~powered verJcle 
an 
upon rHY',~rVl11,O any or any or person, 
3 
11/19/2009 IQ ::: 
NO. 
The statues the state ofIdaho state that it is unlawful for the driver a motor vehicle 
to willfully or attempt to elude a pursuing police vehicle when given a or audible 
signal to bring vchlc1e to a stop, 
1l/19!~Oi')9 F /082 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The statutes of the state of Idaho state that 
pursuit of an actual or suspected violator olthe law, may (a) proceed past a red or stop signal Or 
stop sign, but only after down as may be necessary for safe operation, (b) 
maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger life or property. 
11/1 I 009 TflU 1 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The statutes state of Idaho state that every person drive at a 
appropriate speed when approaching and crossing au intersection, when o.trrr'rl\'41'Ylino 
around a curve .• when approaching a hillcrest, when lraveling llpon any narrow or 
highway, and when special exist with respect to pedestrians or other or reason 
of weather or conditions. 
/ 
46/0 
1 /1 ~ / 0 0 ~ 'rB U 1 36 7/0 
{ 
1/1 / 0 'THU 8/0 
NO. 
An witness is witness who has knowledge a particular matter and 
give his opinion on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should 
the qualifications credibility of the witness and the reasons given for his opinion. 
are not Give it the weight, if any, to which it entitled, 
(n 31 
Hit I 00 'l'fjU 1 7 FAX 9/082 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
evidence is about to be presented to you by u".~'vcHL1V' A is testimony 
taken under oath the trial and preserved in writing. This evidence is entitled to the same 
had the UI1T1'f"'''' testified the ""tr, .. "" t-iand. 
You will only this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of 
testimony you are about to hear, this will 1101 be available to you during your deliberations. 
• 
S 
11 i L 9 ,I ~ 0 9 'rH U 1 7 '50/08 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
A person who a condition, pain, or disability at the time of an injury is not entitled to 
recover damages However, he is "Ln.",,,,," to recover uaLUU/~v'" for any "ITOTfiv'», 
or the 
If you find 
was 
or then if your is in 
plaintiff you ofthe condition or pam or 
proximately due to such aggravation, you should not consider any condition, pain, or 
disability which may have prior to the occurrence, or from which the plaintiff may now 
be suffering which was not or contributed to by reason or this occurrence. 
You are to apportion, if possible, between the oondllion, pain, or disability prior to this 
occurrence and the condition, pain, or disability caused by this occurrence, and assess liability 




1 1! 19 i 009 Tn u ~05 IOBZ 
A must ordinary care to 
prevent further rbrn<lC,'" Any results from a failure to care cannot 
11/1 I 009 
L'lSTRUCTION NO. 
In this cuse; you will return special verdict consisting of a of qu~stions which you 
should answer. There are individual questions about the recklessness and negligence or lack of 
eC1(lcs:mei~8 and Athay, Sheriff Dala: Daryl Deputy 
Athayand Deputy Chad Ludwig and other specific questions about the runmmt of damages. Tn 
,","'''-''TOTIO each you must persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that 
your answers is more probably true than not true. Since the on the form 
which you will have are of to you, 1 will the verdict to you 
"",JAW." .. it. It ~tarts: 
"We, the jury, answer questions submitted to us in the special verdict as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1. Did 
ANSWER: Yes 
act with reckless disregard Mr. 
QUESTION NO. conduct, if a ~JH.'Auun'.1w cause 
[fyou have both of the answer next two 
'N 0; will not answer 
Thus, you will that if you should find there was reckless conduct on the part of 
I 
/ 
11/1/200 1 , 
/0 :'. 
was a will 
you bave a verdict But if you find that there was conduct on 
the was a FL V"UL""" cause of the accident, you on. The 
verdict fom1 continues: 
11 QUESTION NO, 4. negligence on the part of Dary 1 Ervin which was a proximate 
ANSWER: Yes 
5, of Kyle 
cause 
on 
If you answered 'No' 4, 5 and 6, you should not answer IUe:5LlC'TI No, 7, 
will next answer Question No.8." 
are now to COlnp,are the fault pa.rties, 
"UYDU to any of the preceding questions, then insert a zero (0) in answer to 
the appropriate in Question 7. If you answered any of the "",1'("'f'i",(1rn,(r questions 
insert in the appropriate lillt:~ fulSwer to Question No.7 




(c) Bear Lake County Sheriff's 






to oause in 
% 
-_% 
TOTAL 100 %" 
The verdict fann yOll from this point It 
IIIf percentage of c;;;msation for the plaintiff is equal to or greater than the ",,,,,,,,,>UL;VU attributed 
to the then you will not answer Question No.8, but will sign 1he verdict If the 
percentage causation attributed to the plaintiff is less than the percentage () f fault attributed to 
defendant, then you will answer Question No.8." 
Question 8 is your .... ~.L\dHU1Hk"V of the total amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff. 
54/08 
11/19/ 00 'l'flU 1 
"QUESTION NO.8. is amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff 
as a result of the accident? 
~'\NSWER: ~ __ ~ __ ." 
You should include in your answer to Question No.6 the total amount of all monetary (la11t1El!1;eS 
which you find the evidence was sustained by the plaintiff. 
"ordict. 
11/19.' 009 ~'BU 12, I ,' v 
I 
1 1 ! 1 l:l 009 Ttl u 
NO. 
Plaintiff Athay that Rich County, Utah, is liable for the YUHW."."" the !>L~~AW.LL 
allegedly suffered as a result a vehicle collision between Kyle Athay and Daryl Erv111 on June 
10) 1999 while Mr. Ervin was being pursued by Sheriff Stacey and Bear 
Athay and Chad Ludwig. 
In it is not 
not 








11/l9/ 00 T!lU 1 :) B/O 
me a a is not "'V1nP","'" 
you of the of the merely to acquaint YDU with to be 
IDJI1.05 
GIVEN ___ -~--__ 
11/1/00 
INSTRUCTION NO. 






That plaintiff was AUjLW ... ", 
with reckless disregard toward the 
damaged; 
That Sheriff Stacets recklessness was a proximate cause of injury 








11/1 1200~ TD!] 1:2::3 FH 
lNSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case defendants have asserted the affirnmti .... e defense 
Daryl Ervin, Bear Lake County Deputy Gregg Athay and/or Bear Lake County 
Ludwig were negligent Defendant burden of proving each of the following propositions: 
1. That the plaintiffl Daryl Ervin, Deputy Gregg Athay and/or Deputy Chad Ludwig 
was negligent; 
2. That the negligence of plaintiff, Daryl Ervin, Deputy Gregg A1hay and/or Deputy 
Chad Ludwig was 11 proximate cause of the injury and damage claimed to have been suffered by 
the plaintiff. 
GIVEN _-___ ~~ 
REFtJSED ___ _ 
MODIFIED __ ~_ 
COVERED 
OTHER ____ _ 
60/08 
1 L!1 /2009 'I'BlJ 12, H F"\L 
1 say 
or you 




REFUSED __ ~_ 
MODIFIED 
COllENED ___ _ 
OrnER 
NO. 
proof on a proposition, or us.;; 
.1 I must is more 
11/19/2CO~ 'rHU 1 
When I use expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause 
, 
In or 
p1'Obabie sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause the 
damag:e would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the inj ury, loss or darnage. It is not a !J~VAiH1Cl.L'" cause if the 
injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway, 
There may one or more proximate causes of an injury. MIen the negligent conduct of 
two or more persons concurrently as substantial bringing about an 
the condLlct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent which 
contributes to the injury. 
IDJI 1 
GIVEN ____ _ 
MODIFIED _~~~_~ 
OTHER 
lL/i I O~ ~'fJU 12dO 3/0 :': 
NO. 
A person aCTS "recklessly" or with v~,v"';:, disregard" if the creates 
UIlreasonsbJe risk of bodily and the person actually the high degree 
probability harm ~111 result c,(IT1tinues in his course of conduct. 
aiJz:l!,c. § 6-901 et as adopted by Arhay v. Siact!y, 146 Idaho 407 (2008) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED __ --
MODIFIED ___ ~ 
1 LI L ~ I 0 (\ ~ 'f H U 1?: 4, 0 I" l'LX 
NO, 
When I use the word "negligencell in these instructions. I meM the failure to use ordinary 
care in management ouels property or person, The words llordinary ct'J'e" mean the care a 
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shovYn by the 
evidence. Negligence may thus consist of failure to something which a 





REFUSED ___ ~ 
MODIFIED ___ ~ 
COVERED __ ~_ 
OTHER~ __ 
not say 
is for you to 
11/19/2009 12: 
/08 
A statute is (1) COmplilh'1Ce vvith statute was 
party had no control placed him in a positiOft of 
violation or (3) an "'""",.."" not of the party's own making him to fail to 
statute or an eXC~3e specifically for within the statute existed. 
IDJI 2.22 (as modified) 
GIVEN ___ ~_ 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED ___ _ 
COVERED_~ 
11/19/ 00 1'flU 1 
JURY lNSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
The statutes of the state ofldaho state thar it is unlawful for any person who is under the 
influence 0 f alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances to drive or be in actual physical 
control of Ii motor vehicle within this state. 
I.e. § 18-8004-
GIVEN __ ~_~ 
MODIFIED ~_~ __ _ 
COVERED __ ---
OTHER_~~ __ 
1 /1 'Jj / ;:: 0 g TEl U 1 4 1 
INSTRUCTION NO, ~ 
The statutes of the state ofIdaho state that upon the immediate approach of an "".1"",.,.,,'1,,11 
or police vehicle making use of an audible or visible signal, the driver of every other 
vehicle must yield the and immediatelY drive to a position parallel to, as dose 
as possible to, the nearest edge or curb of the highway lawful fer parking and clear of any 
intersection, and stop 
vehicle has 
I.e. § 49~625 
GIVEN 
REFUSED ___ _ 
MODIFIED ~~ __ 
COVERED 
OTHER 
remain in position until authorized emergency or police 
when Dtherwise ""·I·"~ •. 1'1 by a peace officer. 
11119/00 TICJU12, 
68/0 " 
INSTRlJCTION NO, . \'2-_ 
statutes of state state that no person shall drive a motor at a 
and rensonable movement of traffic 
or in 
I.e. § 
GIVEN_~ __ _ 
REFUSED 
MODIFrED __ ~ __ 
COVERED ___ ~ __ 
OTHER_~ 
1l/L9/2009 TAU 12:41 
I Z 
A person EI motor is the influence of [an [a 
drug] when, as a result of [drinking an intoxicating beverage ] [using a dmg], the or 
mental abilities are impaired to Lhe degree that driver no longer the capacity to a 
vehicle with the caution characteristic of a sober person of ordinary prudence acting under similar 
Liquor is an intoxicating 
lDJI 2.22.2 
MODIFIED ____ _ 
COVERED ____ ~ 
11/191001 70,'0 
INSTRUCTION 
The statutes otthe state OfIdtiho state that every driver\of a vehicle shall exercise due 
care to avoid colllding with any pec,estJ:1an or any person propelling a human-powered vehicJe 
and shaH an audible necessary. Every driver shall 
upon observing any child or any obviously confused, incapacitated or intoxicated person. 
I.e. § 15 
GIVEN ___ ~_ 
REFUSED ~ __ _ 
MODIFIED ___ _ 
COVERED ___ ~ 
OTHER ___ _ 
11/19/200' THU 1 t 
JURy INSTRUCTION NO. Is; 
The statues of the state of Idaho state that it is unla'Wful for the driver of a motor vehicle 
to willfully flee or attempt to elude a pursuing police vehicle when given a visual or audibJe 
signal to bring the vehicle to a stop_ 
1.e. § 49"1404 
GIVEN 
REFUSED ___ _ 
MODIFIED __ 




1/1 / 009 l'HU 1 
statutes state 
or suspected violator 
so long as 
IDJl modified) 
See':' g/so I.e. § 49-623 
GIVEN 
REFUSED __ 
MODIFIED ~ __ _ 
COVERED __ 
OTHER ___ ~~ __ _ 
in 
law, may (a) proceed past a red or or 
for (b) 
not life or ~"",,,,~ .. +"h, 
!oj 
1 1/ 1 i 009 Til U L 
NO, 
The statutes of the state of Idaho state that every person shall at a and 
appropriate speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, when approaching and going 
around a curve, when approaching a hillcrest, when traveling upon any mlITQW or winding 
highway, and when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason 
of weather or hlghway cDnditions. 
REFUSED __ ~ 
MODIFIED __ ~_-
COVERED __ ~ __ 
OTHER 
/0 Z 
11/1~/200li l'flU 1~1 2 
The statutes of the 
the roadway. 
I.e. § 49-630 
GIVEN 
REFUSED ___ _ 
MODrFIED __ ~_ 




of Idaho state that a vehicle 
11/1$11 009 2'ElIJ 12: 
INSTRUCTION NO. J.:L 
An 'X!'1n .... "c is a witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter and may 
give his opinion on that matter. Tn determining the weight 10 be given such opinion, you should 
consider the qualifications and credibility of the witness end the reasons given opinion. 
are not bound by opinion. it th.: weight, if any, to which you deem it 
GIVEN 
REFUSED ___ _ 
MODIFIED 
COVERED __ _ 
OTHER _____ _ 
1 1! 1 ~ / 009 TfHJ t 21 
P""'"""")eL"'''' to you by deposition. A 
oath the trial preserved writing. This evidence is to same 
consideration you would give had the witness testified from the witness stand, 
You will only receive this testimony in open court, Although there is a record of the 
testimony you arc about to hear, this record will not be available to you du..tfug your deliberations. 
IDJI I 
G1VEN ____ ~ 
REFUSED _~_~~ 
OTHER ___ _ 
i I\)S 
ll!L ,I 00 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO, 
A who a condition, pain, or disability at the time of an injury is not entitled to 
recover \.tCLI,!!"!,,","' therefore. However, he is to recover damages for any aggravation of 
pain, or disability proximately resulting from injury. 
If you find that before this occurrence the plaintiff had a preexisting bodily 'VVLLun,vu 
which was WUUWU,'l" pain or disability, and further find that because ofthis occurrence 
condition 01' the pain or the disability was aggravated, then if your verdict is in 
plaintifr you should consider the aggravation of the condition or the or 
but you should not consider any condition, or proximately due to such 
disability which may existed prior to the occurrence~ or from which the plaintiff may now 
be suffering which was not caused or contributed to by reason of this occurrence. 
You are to apportion, if possible, "",r",.""" the conditioll, pain, or disability plioI,' to 






COVERED ___ _ 
OTHER 
or disability caused by this occurrence, and assess liability 
can reasonably by the ,,,,,,,,,,,,'''',,,, are liable 
7/ 
11/19/ OO~ cr'BU 1 3 
A person 
prevent further damage. 
lDJ19, 






INSTRUCTION NO, ~~ 
damaged must 
loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be 
l1 
1I.!L!i/:Z009 THU 1~143 
NO. 
In this case you will return a special verdict consisting of a 
should answer. are individual questions about the recklessness 8Jld of 
Daryl 
Ludwig and questions about the amount In 
"lU'~""V'" you must be persuaded, considering an the evidence in case, t.~at 
choice of answers is more probably true than not true. Since the on the 
\'1hich yOtl have are of my instructions to you, I will the veJdict to 
explain it. It StiLr1:S: 
"We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us i.e"'! the special verdict us follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1. Did Sheriff act with reckless disregard while pursuing Mr. Ervin? 
ANSWER: No 
QUESTION NO.2. Was Sheriff Sracey',s reckless conduct, if any, a proximate cause of 
plaintiff's 
ANSWER: Yes No 
Jfyou have answered both of the a.bove questions 'Yes,' then please answer the next hvo 
questions. If you have answered either ofthe questions 'No,' you wilt not EmSwer the remaining 
questions, but will simply 
GIVEN 
REFUSED~ __ _ 
MODIFIED _~_ 
COVERED __ ~ 
OTHER 
verdict" 
lLlll OO~ TtlU12lj FAX 
you if yon that on 
s piLrt which was a cause of the accident, then you will verdict 
and imonn the bailiff that yot! But if you find that was on 
the Sheriff Stacey's patt which was a proximate cause of the accident, then you go on. The 
verdict form continues: 
"QUESTION NO, 4. Was there ne~U1gen(;e on the part of Daryl Ervin which was a proxh:nate 
cause of the accident? 
ANS'V1ER: Yes No 
NO.S. there U)i;'-HVV on the part of Kylc Athay whkh WElS a proximate 
cause of the accident? 
No 
QUESTlONNO.6.Was ofBe8l' Lake County deputies 
which was vrULHH," cause of the accident? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
If you answered 'No' to Questions Nos. 4, 5 a1l.q 6, you should not answer llIP:~nrlT't No.7, but 
will next answer Question No.8." 
You are now to compare the of parties. 
answered to atlY the preceding questions, then Ii zero (0) answer to 
REFUSED~ __ 
MODIFIED ~ ___ ~_ 




1 f '" 
in Question No.7. IfYOll answered any of the preceding questions 'Yes/ 
insert in the appropriate line in the answer to Question No.7 the percentage of fault you find 
attribumble to that party. Your percentages must total 100%." 
The fann continues: 
"QUESTION NO.7. We find contributed to the cause of the accident in following 
ea) Daryl Ervin 
(b) Sheriff Dale 
(c) Bear Lake County Sheriffs Deputies 




TOTAL 100 %" 
itself this Jt 
plaintiff is equal to or greater than causation attributed 
to the defend,mt, then you will not answer Question No.3, but will slgn the verdict. If the 
percentage of causation attributed to pJaintiff i3 less than the percentage offault attributed to 
GIVEN ____ _ 
REFUSED~_~ 
MODIFmD ----
COVERED _~ __ _ 
OTHER __ ~._~_. 
11/ 1 /:; 0 0 TH a j , 
defendant, then you will answer Question No. g." 
Question No.8 is your deterrninatJon of the total umount of damages by 
This questLOn asks you: 
"QUEStION NO.8. What is the total amount of damages sustained by the 
you 
lO.n 1 1 (as modified) 
GIVEN ____ _ 
REFUSED ... _~. __ 
MODIFIED 
COVERED ---
OTHER .. --~-~-... -
" 
6 the amount aU 
11 
Kyle Athay 
Attorney At Law 
920 E. Clark 
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DATE TI ME I 
CLERK 
.mDICIAL OF 
CASE NO. CV-02-00072 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL 
VERDICT FOR~1 
NO, 
NO\V, Plaintiff and hereby submits and court the jury the 
following instructions, No. 1-__ 
Plaintiff anticipates and further requests the court give its usual "stock instructions". 
SUBMITTED this __ day of November, 2009. 




case. is the to the law set in 
instructions to those and in way to decide the case. Your decision should be based 
upon a rational and objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on 
sympathy or prejudice. 
It is my duty to iustruct you on the points oflaw necessary to decide the case, and it 
is your duty to follow the law as I You must consider these instructions as a whole, 
not picking out one disregarding others. The 
given or the manner which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance 
of any of them. If you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through 
the Bailiff, and I will try to or explain the point further. 
In the you may consider only the evidence aUUUL","U 
This evidence consists of of the 'witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, 
and any stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments 
may help you understand the evidence and 








it into evidence. My 
must not speculate as to 




to an offered 
are solely my 




such a question or or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. 
In 
Pin 
Remember, a question is not evidence and should be considered only as it meaning to 
answer. 
were an objection was made an answer or 
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection, I the answer or 
remark stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it 
from your minds. In your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but 
must treat it as though never heard it. 
law does not require you to believe all of the evidence ln1>.rrO.N in the course of 
the As the sole judges the facts, you must determine what yon believe and 
what weight you attach to it. 









so doing, you bring with you to of 
evaluating testimony. your 
are 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
When I a has the burden of proof on a 
expression "if you find" or "if you It I mean you must be 







true than not true. 












897 at 902 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
When I use the ""vord "negligence" these instructions, I mean to use 
ordinary care in the of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" 
mean care a would use under nii_~ .. · ..... u." ..... '''''' "'JUHJlUU to 
shown by the evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a 
reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person 
would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does 
not how a reasonably 








person would act under those .. n,""",,,, That is for 
71 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
has proof on each the following nr'ODI[)SlnOn 
1. That the Defendant committed reckless disregard for the safety 
of 
2. That the Defendant's reckless disregard was a cause 
of the Plaintiff's injuries. 
3. That the Plaintiff has suffered damages. 
If you from your consideration of aU the evidence that each of these 








your verdict should Plaintiff. If you 
not 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
On the Defendant's negligence against 
1. 
negligence was a cause of 
be on tIle jury 
\Vas there negligence on tIle part of the Plaintiff Kyle Athay , which was a 
proximate cause of Plaintiff's 
If you fmd from your consideration of aU the evidence that each of these 
propositions has been proved, then you should answer this question "Yes. II you 










When I use expression" proximate cause," I mean a cause that, natural or 
probable sequence, produced the injury, and/or the loss or the damage complained of. It 
need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about 
injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would 
occurred 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent 
conduct of two or more r"",."r ..... c or contributes concurrently as 

















U'-'U'UU0 on the subject of damages, I do not nvn .... "''' 
is 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
must determine the amount of 
is entitled to recover 
that will reasonably and compensate the 
Plaintiff damages proved to be proximately caused by the 
The elements damage the jury may consider are: 





rrnn¥1lr of abilities to perform usual 
hythe 
caused to any 
value of necessary medical care .'o.<'onT<>n 
acts. 
incurred as a result of the injury, the present cash value of medical care and expenses 
reasonably certain and necessary to be required in the future; 
the injury, 
The reasonable value of the past earnings lost as a 
The present cash value of the future earning capacity 
into the earning power, age, 
of the injury; 
because of 
and physical abilities, habits, and disposition of the Plaintiff, and any other circumstances 
shown by the evidence. 
The reasonable value of necessary services provided by 
doing things the Plaintiff which, except for the injury, the would ordinarily 
have performed, and the value of pr'TH"~" reasonably to be 






'Vhether Plaintiff proved any of these elements is for the jury to 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
of the questions you to determine is whether or not Sheriff was 
acting 'within the scope of his authority. 
An agent within the scope of his authority is he is engaged in the transaction of 
business.which has assigned to him by his principal, or if he is doing anything which 
reasonably be said to have been contemplated as a part of his employment. is not 






One is at a given time he is au'mCjr~~ea to act for, or 
the place of, such other person. The term "agent" includes servants and employees; and 










Dale was the of Rich County Utah at 
described by L'~"H~'-'. Therefore, any performance done by 


















case, but is 
out to 
is not to be considered 







the premises involved in this case. What you observed 
should consider your view of the premises 
applying the evidence produced here in trial. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case, you will be given a Special Verdict Form to use in returning your 
verdict. This form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the 
verdict form to you now. 
"We, the Jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the Special Verdict as 
follows: 
"QUESTION NO. 1. Was there reckless disregard for the safety of others on the 
part of the Defendant Sheriff Dale Stacey, which was the proximate cause of the accident"? 
Answer: Yes __ No. 
If you answered the above question "Yes", then please answer Questions No. 2and 3. 
If you answered the above question "No", then simply sign the verdict form and inform the 
Bailiff that you are done. 
The verdict form continues. 
"QUESTION NO.2. Was there negligence on the part ofthe Daryl Ervin which 
was the proximate cause of the accident"? 
"QUESTION NO.2. Was there negligence on the part ofthe Plaintiff Kyle Athay 
which was the proximate cause of the accident"? 
Answer: Yes No. 
If you answered "No" to Questions No. 2and 3, then you will not answer Question 
No.4, but will next answer Question No.5. 
If you answered "Yes" to both prior questions, then answer Question No.4. 
QUESTION NO.4: We find that the parties contributed to the cause of the accident 





The Plaintiff Kyle Athay 
The Defendant Dale Stacey 




The verdict form itself guides you from this point. It says: 
"If the percentage of negligence for the Plaintiff is 50% or more, then you will not 
answer any further questions, but will sign the verdict". 
"If the percentage of negligence for the Plaintiff is less than 50%, you will answer 
Question No.4". 
QUESTION NO.4 is your determination of the total amount of damages sustained 
by the Plaintiff. This question asks you: 
"QUESTION NO.4: "'hat is the total amount of damages sustained by the Plaintiff 
Kyle Athay as a result of the accident"? Answer: 
You should include in your answer to Question No.4 the total amount of all 
monetary damages which you find from the evidence was sustained by the Plaintiff. 







On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a Foreman, who will 
preside over your deliberations. 
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you "rith any instructions. Use 
only the ones conforming to your conclusions and return the others unused. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. If your 
verdict is unanimous, your Foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the 
entire jury agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the Bailiff, 







IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




RICH COUNTY, UTAH, 








) SPECIAL VERDICT 
) 
) 
WE THE JURY, answer the questions submitted to us in the special verdict as follows: 
"QUESTION NO.1: Did the Defendant Sheriff Dale Stacey commit reckless disregard of 
the rights of others, which was a proximate cause of the accident?" 
Answer: Yes No --
If you answered question 1 "Yes," then please answer Questions No.2 and 3. If you 
answered questions 1 ''No'' then simply sign the verdict form and inform the Bailiff that you 
are done. 
If you answered Question No.1 "Yes", please answer Question 2 and 3.Ifyou answered 
the above question "No", then simply sign the verdict form and inform the Baillifthat you are 
done. 
Special Verdict - PAGE 1 
"QUESTION NO.2: Was there comparative responsibility on the part of Daryl Ervin 
which was a proximate cause of the accident?" 
Answer: Yes No 
"QUESTION NO.3: Was there comparative responsibility on the part of Kyle Athay 
which was a proximate cause of the accident?" Answer: Yes __ No __ . 
If you answered ''No'' to Questions 2 and 3, then you will not answer Question No.4, but 
will answer Question No.5. 
If you answered "Yes" to both prior Questions, then answer Question No.4. 
You are now to compare the responsibility of the parties. Insert in the answer to Question 
No.4, the percentage of comparative responsibility you find attributable to each party. Your 
percentages must total 100%. 
"QUESTION NO.4: We find that the parties contributed to the cause of the accident in 
the following percentages: 
(a) The Defendant Dale Stacey % 
(b) Daryl J. Ervin % 
(d) The Plaintiff Kyle Athay % --
TOTAL 100% 
The verdict form itself guides you from this point. It says: 
Special Verdict - PAGE 2 
rlYli-f's J"LU-1j I n5-tr 
"If the percentage of comparative responsibility for the Plaintiff is 50% or more, then you 
will not answer any further questions, but will sign the verdict." 
"If the percentage of comparative responsibility for the Plaintiff is less than 50% you will 
answer Question No.5. 
Question No 5 is your determination ofthe total amount of damages sustained by the 
Plaintiff. This question asks you: 
"QUESTION NO.5: What is the total amount of damages sustained by the PlaintiffKyie 
Athay as a result of the accident?" Answer: 
You should include in your answer to Question No.5 the total amount of all monetary 
damages which you find from the evidence, was sustained by the Plaintiff. 
Finally, you should sign the verdict form as explained in another instruction. 
DATED this . __ day of December, 2009 
FOREMAN 
Special Verdict - PAGE 3 
-rlntf(s :S~ Ins-&-
P.O, Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID U.J.v",,-, 
Telephone: (208) 528 
Telefax: (208) 528-6447 
PETER STIRBA (Utah Bar No. 3118) 
R. BLAKE HAMILTON (Utah Bar No. 11395) 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
215 South State Street, Suite '750 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Telefax: (80 1) 364-8355 
Attorneys for Defendant 
20lU JUH 29 PM 4: 51 
, . jiJOC;(, CLERK 
j •• ...-.. 
NO. 
iE?UTy------
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 
KYLEATHAY> 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV-02-000n 
v. 
RICH COUNTY, DT AH. 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL 
VERDICT FORM 
Defendant. 
Defendant Rich County. Utah, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby submits its 
proposed jury instructions pursuant to I.RC.P. 51. Further, the Defendant requests leave 10 offer 
JUN/:L LUIU/TU~ Uj: lb ~M ~llts:bA C( i~~~UL.IP,jt~ HI NO. bUl jb4 bj~J Y. UUj 
such other and additional instructions as may, during the course of the trial, become appropriate. 
Defendant also requests that the Court submit the case to the jury on the attached special verdict 
form. See Attachment I'A." 
A. Defendant requests that the Court give stock instructions on the following 
subjects and principles of law: 
1. yerdict/juty's responsibility; 
2. province of the Court; 
3. province of the jury; 
4. statements and arguments of counsel are not evidence; 
5. objections by counsel not to influence the jUJY; 
6. review of evidence confined to evidence received in the courtroom; 
7. direct and circumstantial evidence; 
8. weight of the evidence; 
9. jurfS recollection controls; 
10. credibility of witnesses; 
11. impeachment; 
12. reaching a verdict; 
13. selecting a foteman; and, 
14. communications with the Court 
S. In addition to the above, Defendant requests that the following instructions also 
be given b;y the CoUJt. One original and Qne copy of Defendant's proposed instructions have 
J UN/2 20) O/TUE : If PM l t{BP, & jATE~ HA No, bUl jb4 bjJJ y, UU4 
been attached hereto. Pursuant to LRC.P. 51(a)(l), the originals contain a blank space for 
,!Umbering. See Attachment "B." The duplicates are numbered and contain citations. See 
Attachment "c." 
OATEtJ this L ~ day ofJune, 2010. 
LWf /nsir 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
By: 
R. BLAKE HAMIL TON 
PBTER STIRBA 
Attorneys for Defendant 
JUN/29/2010/TUE 03:1'1 PM IX I~SSUCI ~H No. ~Ul Y. UUJ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Z+- day of June, 2010 I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S P:ROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM by the method indicated below, to the following: 
Craig R JorgenseIl; Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
1246 Yellowstone Avenue, Suite A4 
P.O. Box 4904 
Pocatello, ID 83205~4904 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Alan 10hnston 
E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A. 
151 NorthRidge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, lD 83403-2949 
Attorney for Defendants 
Honorable Mitchell W, Brown 
District Judge - Resident Chambers 
P.O, Box 775 
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276 
() U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
()O~htMai1 
~simile 
() U.S, Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
()O~htMail 
(~c8imile 
( ) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
() Ov . tMail 
JUN/29/20 10/TUE 03: 17 PM ST IRBA & ASSOCIATES FAX No. 801 Jb4 ~J~~ P. U(Jo 
Exhibit "A" 
J UN/29/20 1 O/TUE : 17 PM I RBIl. 8, ~,ssoc I ATES F NO,dUl [I, UUI 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
Plaintiff Kyle Athay claims that Rich County, Utah, is liable for the damages the Plaintiff 
allegedly suffered as a result of a vehicle collision between Kyle Athay and Daryl Ervin on June 
10, 1999, while Mr. Ervin was being pursued by Sheriff Stacey and Bear Lake County Deputies 
Gregg Athay and Chad Ludwig. 
In defense, Rich County claims it is not liable because Sheriff Stacey acted with the 
appropriate level of care during the relevant incident and because Sheriff Stacey' 8 conduct was 
not a proximate cause of Plaintiff's alleged damages. Defendant further claims that the incident 
was caused solely or partially by the negligence of Daryl Ervin. Gregg Athay, Chad Ludwig, 
Bear Lake County, Kyle Athay. and Wyoming Downs, 
Additionally; Rich County claims that if Sheriff Stacey's conduct is found to be reckless, 
this conduct falls outside the scope of Stacey's employment with Rich County and thus Rich 
County cannot be held liable for any injuries prO)(imately caused by Stacey's recklessness. 
This instruction is not intended to be a statement of facts nor what the evidence in this 
case has shown, but rather it is me-.rely a summary by the Court of the respective claims made by 
the parties in this case. 
jtJO 
JUN/29/201 : 15 PM & 
215 SOUTH STATE STREttT. SUITE 750 
POST OFFICE BOX 810 
FAX No,801 P UU\ 
STIRBA 
AND ASSOCIATES 
A PROFESSTC)l-lAL LAW CORPORAnON 
www.Stirb .... CCll1\ 
SAlT LAJ(): CITY. UTAH 84110·0810 
TELEPHONE, 80 l· 364-8300 
fACSlMILe: 801.3ti4·iU55 





No, of Pages; 
COMMENTS! 
Clerk of the Court 
Bear Lake County Courthouse 
Honorable Mitchell W. Brown 
Resident Chambers 
Craig R. Jorgensen 
Attorney at Law 
Alan J aMston 
RW. Pike & Assoclates 
R. Blake Hamilton 
Stirba & Associates 
Athay v. Rich CQunty - Case No, CV-02-000n 
4P~ 29j 2010 






the Inforanl'ltioo. \,iJllt8lined In [111$ facsimile message Is informatioll protected hy attorney·client andJQf tho IItt(Jmby/wark product 
privilege" It Is Illh,naed only for tlte use of the inrlj'\;'iduAlllllmed above and the privileges lire not waived by virtue flfthla navlng 
beell sent tJy facoimile. lfthc person actlll\ll)' rt{;ili'Ving diu facsimile or any aiher reade.r of tilt facsimile is not th~ II am in! fodplent 
or the employell Of agent responsible. to deliver it m the lllIIJl:ied t'edplent, any lise, diueminfttion, distl'ibution 01' copying of the 
communication is $tdctly prohibited. 11)'ou hl4vt recel¥ed this communication In error, p(j~a8e immediately notify liB by telephone 
at (801) 364-83j)(/ ltlHJ return the original Jl:iessitge ro 0$ *t tbe above address via the U.S. P(}stal Servke. 
/D/ 
J UN/29/20 I O/TUE 03: 18 PM IATES FAX No. 801 55 
JURy INSTRUCTION NO. 
The burden ofproofis upon a party making a claim to establish its claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
P. 008 
By "burden of proof" it is meant the obligation resting on the party o:r parties who assert a 
proposition 'to establish the same by a preponderance of the evidence presented in this case, 
regardless of which party may have produced such evidence. 
By "preponderance of the evidence" is meant that evidence which is most convincing and 
satisfying in the controversy between the parties. regardless of which party may have produced 
such evidence. It means the greater weight of the evidence, or that the evidence has a greater 
probability oftmth when compared to the evidence opposed to it. 
/o~ 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
The TIlles of evidence ordinarily do not pelmit the opinion of a witness to be received as 
evidetl.ce. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. A person who, by 
education, study and exp:<ri<:nco, has become an expert in an art, science or profession, and who 
is called as a witness, may give his opinion as to any such matter in which he is versed and 
whk~h is material to the case you should consider such expert opinion and should weight the 
reasOlLS, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion, Give it the weight 
which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it, if in your 
judgment the reasons given for it are unsound. 
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JORY INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is your duty to hear and determine this case the same as if it were between individuals, 
The fact that the Plaintiff is an individual and the Defendant is a cotmty in the State, of Utah 
should make no difference whatsoever to you. You should return a true and just verdict 
according to the facts and the law as I give it to you, without reference to the county or 
individual character of any party. 
J OIO/TUE :19 FAX 110,801 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
R" "h h .JJJ 
You will note that the person whose conduct we set up as a standard is not the 
p, 0 II 
extraordinarily cautious individual, nor the exceptionally skillful one. but a person of reasonable 
and ordinary prudence. 'While exceptional caution and skill are to be admired and encouraged, 
the law does not demand them as a general standard of conduct. 
JUN/29/2010/TUE 03:20 PM STIRPli & ASSOCIATES FAX No. 801 P. U lL 
JURy INSTRUCTION NO. 
Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would have done 
under the circumstances) or doing what such person under such circumstances wou.ld not have 
done. 1ne fault may lie in acting Or in omitting to act. 
J UNn~/ LUI U/l'lJ ~ Ijj: L U f M ~)1ll\t:P, IX g:::;:::;UC lIHf'.:) 'AI NO ~Ul j04 ~j j r. U [j 
JURYrNSTRUCTION NO. 
A person acts "recklessly" or with "reckless disregard" if the person's conduct creates an 
unreasonable risk of bodily harm, and the person actually perceives the high degree of 
probability that harm will result and continues in his course of conduct. 
Actual knowledge of the high degree of probability that harm will result does not require 
knowledge of the actual person or persons at risk. or the exact manner in which they would be 
harmed, It only requires knowledge of the high degree of probability of the kind of harm that the 
injured party suffered. 
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J1JRYINSTRUCTION NO. 
When I use the expression "proximate cause, II I mean a cause which, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause the 
damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only causo. It is sufficient if it is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injuryl loss or dama.ge, It is not a proximate cause if the 
injUlY, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent eonduct of 
two or more persons contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an injury, 
the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to which each 
contributes to the injury, 
JOt) 
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JURYlNSTRUCTION NO. 
In order to recover on his claim against Defendant. the Plaintiff must establish the 
following elements in order to recover: 
1'. U 1 J 
First: That Sheriff Stacey acted with reckless disregard toward the safety of others, 
SecQnd: That Sheriff Stacey's recklessness was a proximate cause of injuty and damage 
to Plaint~ and 
Third: That Sheriff Stacey's conduct is imputable to Rich County. 
If you find that the Plaintiff has established each of the following by a preponderance of 
the evidence, your ve1'dict will be for the Plaintiff. Otherwise, you verdict will be for the 
Defendam. 
J UN/ LUlU/lUI<, Jj: n I'M (jllK15R &: If~00UlvlP,1t0 r A1. 110, aU 1 50'! bYJ r, U l 0 
nJRY INSTRUCTION NO. 
The Defendant claims that Daryl Ervin, was negligent and that his negligence solely or 
putially proximately cause the accident and Plaintiff's injuries. Defendant claims Daryl Ervin 
was negligent in that he failed to use due care in: 
(a) Driving when he knew or should have known he was intoxicated; and/or 
(b) Fleeing a Police Officer; and/or; 
(c) Keeping his vehicle under reasonably safe and propet control; and! or 
(d) FaiHng to drive at such a speed as was safe, reasonable and prudent under 
the circumstances. having due regaI'd to the width, surface, curvature and condition of the 
highwciy; the traffic thereon, the visibility, and any actual or potential hazards then 
, 
<:;xistil1g. 
f J 0 
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JURY INS TRUCTION NO. 
In this case the law requires that you determine whether the negligence of any other party 
cO,ltributed to the accident as a proximate cause. Bear Lake County Deputies Gregg Athay and 
Chad Ludwig> the other officers involved in the pursuit, Kyle Athay, and/or the Wyoming 
Downs are all parties whose conduct may have oontributed to the accident. 
You will address the issue of the possible negligence of each of the above parties as you 
answer the special verdict form. 
/II 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
1 he statutes of the State of Idaho state that the driver of a police vehlc.1e. when in the 
pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, may (a) proceed past a red or stop signal or 
stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation~ (b) exceed the 
maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger life or property, and (0) disregard 
tegulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions. 
J UN/29/20 IO/TUE : 23 PM & ASSOCIATES FAX No, 801 
JURy lNS TRDCTION NO. 
A violation of a statute is negligence, unless (1) compliance with the statute was 
impossible. or (2) something over which the party had 110 conn:ol placed him in a position of 
violation oftlte statute" or (3) an emergency not of the partyts own making caused him to fail to 
obey the statute Or an excuse specifically provided for within the statute existed 
J/3 
JUN/29/2010/TUE 03: PM STIRpr~ & ASSOC1ATES FAX No, 801 364 83 p, 020 
JURY INS TRUCTION NO. 
In the State ofIdaho it is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or any other intoxicating substances to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle within this state. The evidence in this case is that Daryl Ervin had a blood alcohol level 
of .13 or .11, which is above the legal limit. 
1/~ 
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JURlllNSTRUCTION NO. 
It is a felony in the State of Idaho for the driver of a motor vehicle to willfully flee or 
attempt to elude a pursuing police vehicle when given a visual or audible signal to bring the 
vehicle to a stop_ 
II~ 
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JURYINSTRlJCTION NO. 
The statutes ofthe State of Idaho state that every person shall drive at a safe and 
appropriate speed when approaching and crossing an intersection) when approaching and going 
around a curve, when approaching a hillcrest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding 
highway, and when special haz.ards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason 
of weather or highway conditions. 
f/~ 
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JURy INSTRUCTION NO, 
The statutes of the State ofldaho state that no person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a 
slow speed as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced 
speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with the law. 
J)1 
J lJN/29/20 I O/TUE fJ3: 25 PM STIRI)'A & lATES FAX N 0, ~Ul ~j P, U 4 
JURy INS TRUCTION NO. 
The statutes of the State of Idaho state that a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of 
the roadway. 
} I ~ 
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JURY INS TRUCTION NO, 
The statutes of the State of Idaho state that upon the immediate approach of an authorized 
emergency or police vehicle making use of an audible Ot visible signal, the driver of every other 
vehicle must yield the right-of-way and immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close 
as possible to, the nearest edge or curb of the highway lawful for parking and clear of any 
intersection. and stop and remain in that position until the authorized emergency or police 
vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed by a peace officer. 
J ,1 
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JURy INSTRUCTION NO. 
The statutes of the State ofIdaho state that every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due 
care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any perSOn propelling a human-powered vehicle 
and shall give an audible signal when necessary. Every driver shall exercise proper precaution 
upon observing any child or any obviously confused, incapacitated or intoxicated person. 
JUNIL~nUlu/rUJ:<; : '{I r'M ::lllKI)P. &. P,~~UL1P.lt0 HI 1'10, tJU 1 jOEt ijJ:Jj r, U 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
The statutes of Idaho state that the primary responsibility of the county sheriff to enforce 
aU penal provisions of any and all statutes of the state of Idaho. In order to carry out this duty to 
preserve the peace, the county sheriff is required to prevent and suppress all breaches of the 
peace which may COme to his knowledge and arrest all persons Who attempt to commit or who 
have committed a public offense. 
j:J.. f 
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JlJRYINSTRUCTION NO. 
An agency relationship exists where one. called the "principal," has authorized 
another. called the "agent," to act on behalf of the principal. Age11cy requires the consent of the 
principal. which may be express or implied. The term "principal" includes employers and the 
term Hagent" includes employees. 
JUN/29/20!0/TUE 03: 27 & lATES FAX No, 801 p, 9 
JlJRYlNSTRUCT10N NO. 
The principal is responsible for the acts of ~ts agent that are within the agenf s scope of 
authority. 
JUN/29/20 1 D/TUE PM STIRBA & ASSOC1ATES FAX No, 801 83'J'J P. U3U 
JlJRYINSTRUCTION NO. 
Conduct is v.tithin the scope of the agent's authority if it occurs while the agent is 
engaged in the duties that the agent was asked Or expected to perform and relates to those duties, 
It is not necessary that a particular act or failure to act be expressly authorized by the principal to 
bring it within the scope of the agent's authority. Conduct for the benefit of the principal that is 
customarily connected with, or reasonably necessary for the performance of such duties is within 
the scope of the agent's authority. 
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JURYlNSTRUCTION NO. 
1 will nOW instruct you concerning the Plaintiff's claims of damages. Dle fact that I give 
you instructions regarding damages does not mean that I believe the Plaintiff is entitled to 
recover any damages in this case. Instructions about damages are given to you merely as a guide 
in the event you tInd from a preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiffis entitled to 
recover. If you find the issues in favor of the Defendant, you shall disregard my instructions 
about damages. 
'AI NO. dUI jb4 dj~~ r, U 5L 
JURYlNSTRUCTION NO. 
If you find the issues in favor Dfthe Plaintiff and against the Defendant, it will be your 
duty to award the Plaintiff such damages, if any, as you may find from a preponderance of the 
evidence will fairly and adequately compensate Plaintiff for any injury and damage he has 
sustained as a proximate result of the Defendant's negligence complained of by Plaintiff. 
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JURY INS TRUCTION NO. 
Ifycu should find that Plaintiff is entitled to a verdict, in arriving at the amount of the 
award you should include: 
(a) Any reasonable and necessary expense to the Plaintiff for medical, 
surgical, hospital and other services, care and supplies which you find by a 
preponderance of the evidence has already been incurred as a result of the accident or 
which you find by a preponderance of evidence will be required to be expended in future 
treatment of the Plaintiff as a result of the accident in question; and, 
(b) The reasonable value of the time, if any, shown by the evidence in the case 
to have been necessarily been lost up to date by Plaintiff since the injury because of being 
unable to pursue his occupation as a result of the injury. In determining this amount, you 
should consider any evidence of Plaintiffs earning capacity, his earnings, the manner in 
which he ordinarily occupied his time before the injury, and find what he was reasonably 
certain to have earned during the time so lost had Plaintiff not been dis.abled; and, 
( c) Also, s'uch sum as will reasonably compensate Plaintiff for any 10s8 of 
future earning power caused by the injury in question whlch you find from the evidence 
in the case that PlaintiffwUl probably suffer in the future. In determining this amount, 
you should consider what Plaintiff's health, physical ability and earning power were 
bet ore the accident and what they are now; the nature and extent of Plaintiff' S injuries, 
JUN/2912010/TUE 03: 0 PM IRBA &. JATES FAX No, 801 r, U 4 
whether or not they probably will be permanent or, ifnot permanent, the extent of their 
duration; all to the end of determining, first, the effect, if any, of Plaintiffs injury upon 
his future earning capacity; and, second, the present value of any loss offuture eaming 
power which you find from the evidence in the case that Plaintiff will probably suffer in 
the future as a resulr of the injury in questions; and, 
(d) Such sum as will compensate Plaintiff reasonably for any plain, suffering and 
mental anguish already suffered by him and reSUlting from the injury in question and for any 
pain, su1'tering and mental anguish which your tInd form the evidence in the case that Plaintiff 
will pro;)ably suffer in the future form the same cause. 
fn~tr- /;),3 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are the sole judges of the amount of damages, if any; sustained by Plaintiff, You are 
not bOUnd to accept any opinion offered by any expert witness on the issue of damages. nor are 
you required to accept any method, reason or theory on which any expelt relies. There is no 
precisely accurate method by which to calculate the damages claimed by Plaintiff. If you find by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the Plailltiffhas incurred some damage) you are not bound 
to employ any particularly method in determining the amount of damage, but you may use your 
own sense, judgment and experience in determining what is reasonable and fair. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
Damages must be reasonable, If you should find that the Plaintiff is entitled to a verdict, 
you may award only such damage as will reasonably compensation Plaintiff for such injury and 
damage as you may find from a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff has sustained, 
You are note permitted to award any damages that are speculative. If you deicide to 
award any damages, you can award only such damages as you lllay find the Plaintiff has proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence, Damages that are possible, but not probable> are speculative 
and cannot be awruded. 
J UN/L r, U) i 
ruRY INS TRUCTION NO. 
A person who has a condition, pain. or disability at the time of an injury is not entitled to 
tecOver damages therefore. However, he is entitled to recover damages for any aggravation of 
such preexisting condition, pain, or disability proximately resulting from the injury. 
which was causing pain or disability) and further find that because of this occurrence the 
condition or the pain Or the disability was aggravated, then if your verdict is in favor of the 
Plaintiff you should consider t.~e aggravation of the condition ar the pain or the disability 
proxin1ately due to such aggravation, but you should not consider any condition, pain, Qr 
disability which may have existed prior to the occurrence, or from which the Plaintiff may now 
be suffering which was not caused or contributed to by reason of this occurrence. 
You are to apportion, if possible, between the condition, pain or disability prior to this 
occurrence, and the condition, pain ot disability caused by this occurrence, and assess liability 
accordingly. If no apportionment can reasonably be made by you, thell the Defendant is liable 
for the entire damage. 
:r~ /nsLr 
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JURV INS TRUCTION NO. 
If you should find that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover any damages for any loss of 
income or for any expenditure of medical expenses that will not occur until SOme time in the 
future, you must reduce any such damages to their present value. You calculate the present value 
on the assumption that any money you might award. except the amount currently needed, win be 
invested so as to yield the highest interest or return that is available with reasonable security, 
rl\A l1U, ClUj JU't OJ'J'J 1, UJJ 
JURy INSTRUCTION NO. 
With regard to diminished future income, the Plaintiff has a duty to minimize his 
damages by making reasonable efforts to seek employment in any work that he is capable of 
performing and by earning as much as he can. If you find that the Plaintiff is entitled to be 
compensated for loss of future income, then you must reduce his damages by all sums the 
Plaintiff could reasonably be expected to earn from the employment, which Plaintiff is tequired 
to pursue in mitigation of his loss. 
/33 
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JlJRY INSTRUCTION NO. 
The standard table of mortality which the Court has judicially noticed and received in 
evidence. in this case may be considered by you in determining how long the Plaintiff may live. 
According to the table of mortality, the life expectancy in this C0U11try for a male person 26 years 
of age is 77. 
Life expectancy, as shown by a mortality table~ is merely an estimate of the probable 
average remaining length of life of all persons in the United States of a given age and sex, and 
that estimate is based upon a limited record of experience, So. the infel'ence which may 
reasonably be dra'Nll from life expectancy, as shown by the table, applies only to one who has 
the average health and exposure to danger of people of that age and sex. 
In determining the reasonably certain life expectancy of the Plajntiff, you should 
consider, in addition to what is shown by the table of mortality, all other facts and circumstances 
iIl evidence in the case bearing upon the life expectancy of the Plaintiff, including his 
occupation. habits. past health record and present state of health. 
When considering life expectancy) in determining any reasonable certain future damage. 
you will bear in mind, ()f ct)"lirse, the distinction between entire-life expectancy a.nd work-life 
expectancy. 
Those elemenTS of damages that are related to future income should be measured only by 
tlle Plaintiffs remaining work-life expectancy, not his entire life expecla1'lcy. 
/31 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view of 
reaching an agreement, if you call do so without violence to individual judgment. You must each 
decide the case for yourself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence in the case 
with your i'elluw jurors. In the course ofyoux deliberations, do no hesitate to re-examine your 
own views aDd change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But, do not surrender your 
honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence. solely because of the opinion of your 
fellow jururs or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. 
R ",member at all times that you are not partisans. You are judges 
Your s"le interest is tb seek the truth from the evidence in the case, 
of the facts, 
rAA 110. !:lUi JO't OJJJ r. U if 
Exhibit "B" 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




RICH COUNTY, UTAH, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV -02-00072 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the special verdict as follows: 
QUESTION NO.1. Did Plaintiff establish by a preponderance of evidence that Sheriff 
Stacey acted with reckless disregard while pursuing the intoxicated motorist, Daryl Ervin? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QlJESTION NO.2. If Sheriff Stacey acted with reckless disregard, was his 
recklessness a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's accident? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO.3. If Sheriff Stacey a.cted with reckless disregard, was his reckless 
conduct established by a preponderance of evidence to be within the scope of his employment 
with Rich County and, therefore, attributable to Rich County? 
)37 
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ANSWER: Yes No 
I [you have answered each of the Questions Nos. 1,2 and 3 "Yea," then please answer 
the 1 Ol1l)Wing questions. If you have answered any of the Questions Nos. 1 j 2 and 3 "No," you 
wil:Jl' 1 answer the remaining questions, but will simply sign the verdict. 
QUESTION NO.4, Was the intoxicated motorist, Daryl Ervin, lIegligel!t and was his 
negligence a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's accident? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO.5. Was there negligence on the part of Gregg Athay that was a 
proximate cause of the Plaintiff's accident? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO.6. Was there negligence on the part of Chad Ludwig tllat was a 
proximale cause of the Plaintiff's accident? 
ANSWER; Yes No 
QUESTION NO.7. Was there negligence on the part ofthe Bear Lake County that was 
a P1Q:xj :nate cause of the Plaintiff s accident? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO.8. Was there negligence on the part of the Plaintiff: Kyle Athay that 
was a proximate eause of the Plaintiff's accident? 
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QUESTION NO, 9. Was there negligence on the part of the Wyoming Downs that was 
a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's accident? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
If you answered "No" to Questions Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, you should not answer 
Question No.IO, but will next answer Question No. 11. 
riyau answered I'No" to any of the preceding questions, then insert a zero (0) in the 
answer to the appropriate line in Question No. 11. If you answered any of the preceding 
questions "Yes,ll insert in the appropriate liDe in the answer to Question No. II the percentage of 
causation you find attributable to that party. 
QUESTION NO. 10. We find the parties contributed to the cause of the Plaintiffs 
injuries in the following percentages: 
(a) Rich County % 
(b) Daryl Ervin 
(c) Gregg Athay 
(d) Chad Ludwig % 
(c) Bear Lake County % 
(t) Kyle Athay -_% 
(g) Wyoming Downs % 
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bef 
QUESTION NO, 11. What is the total amount of damages sustained by Kyle Athay as a 
result of the accident? 
ANSWER: 
Dated this __ day ofJuty, 2010 
FOREPERSON 
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ALAN JOHNSTON (Idaho Bar No. 7709) 
E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P .A. 
151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Telephone: (208) 528-6444 
Telefax: (208) 528-6447 
PETER S11RBA (Utah Bar No. 3118) 
R. BLAKE HAMILTON (Utah Bar No. 11395) 
STIRBA & ASSOCIA YES 
215 South State Street. Suite 750 
P.O. Box IHO 
~alt Lake City, UT 84110~0810 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Telefax: (801) 364-8355 
Auorneyg for Defendant 
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!TRICT COURT 
SIXTH JUDICIAL COURT 
BEAR LAKE COUNTY IDAHO 
J~ ~ ,J.D.} 0::::--__ _ 
- --:DJATE r TIME 
CLERK 
DEPUTY CASE NO. 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 
Plaintiff: 
j~h'H COUNTY, UTAH, 
Defeudant. 
Case No. CV -02-00072 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
SUPPLEMENTAL JURy INSTRUCTIONS 
AND SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Defendant Rich County, Utah; by alld through lUldel'signed counsel, hereby submits its 
proposed supplemental jury instructions purSl.'lltnt to LRC.P. 51. One original and one copy of 
It! I 
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Defendant's proposed instructions have been attached hereto. Pursuant to LR.C.P. 51(a)(1), the 
originals eontam a blank space for numbering. See Attachment "A." The duplicates are 
numberod and contain citations, See Attachment "B." 
DATED thislday of July. 2010. 
STlRBA & ASSOCIATES 
By: 
R. BLAKE HAMILTON 
PETER STIRBA 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this <iJ day of July, 2010 I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL JlJRY 
INSTRUCfIONS AND SPECIAL VERDICT by the method indicated below, to the 
following: 
Craig R Jorgensen, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
1246 Yellowstone Avenue, Suite A4 
P.O, Box 4904 
Pocatello, In 83205-4904 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Alan Johnston 
E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A 
t51 North Ridge Ave" Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls> ID 83403-2949 
Attorney for Defendants 
Honorable Mitchell W. Brown 
District Judge .- Resident Chambers 
P.O. Box 775 
Soda Springs. Idaho 83276 
() U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
()~ghtMail 
( ..:yFacsimile 
() U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( )~tght Mail 
(-1"F acsimile 
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
() Ov 'ght Mail 
acsimile 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
The law ofthls case is that Mr. Daryl John Ervin, Jr., pled guilty to the felony crimes of 
eludillg a police officer and ~lggravated driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Under Idaho law, 1. C. § 49-1404, a person is guilty of eluding a police officer if the 
driver of a motor vehicle willfully flees or attempts to elttde a pursuing police vehicle when 
given h visual ar audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, and while so doing: (a) travels in 
excess 01 thirty (30) miles per hour above the posted speed limit; (b) causes damage to the 
prop(~rty of another or bodily injury to another; (0) drives his vehicle in a manner as to endanger 
or likelY to endanger the property of another or the person of another; or Cd) leaves the state, 
Under Idaho law, I.e. § 18~8006; a person is gUilty of aggravated driving under the 
in±luence of alcohol if a person, while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other 
intoxicating substances. or any combination of alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating 
6ubstimces, or who has an alcohol concentration ofO.OS or more) as shown by analysis of his 
bi.lad, urine or breath, drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this State, 
whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public 
and causes great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to any person 
other than himself. 
/# 
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JlJRY INSTRUCTION NO. 
The law of this case is that the Idaho Supreme Court had determined that the actions of 
Bear Lake County Officers Greg Athay and Chad Ludwig during the pursuit of1vfr. Daryl John 
Ervin, Ir., did not, as a matter of law, amolmt to reckless disregard. 
· FILED 
IN THE DISTRICT C01JRT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICtt&i{t~lf;'{ C~~=;!::/~!:b_ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE - "'-,,, I 
***** 
KYLED, ATIlAY, 
) Case No, CV -2002-00072 
Plaintiff, ) 
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We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Question No.1: Was Sheriff Dale Stacey's conduct on June 10, 1999 within in the scope 
of his authority as an agent of Rich County, Utah? 
Answer to Question No.1: Yes l2{J NoL..J 
Qnestion No.2: Did Sheriff Dale Stacey's conduct amount to reckless disregard, and if 
so, was this reckless disregard a proximate cause of Kyle Athay's injuries? 
Answer to Question No.2: Yes LXJ No [--.-J 
If you answered "No," to either question 1 or 2 you are done. Sign the verdict as 
instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the 
next question. 
Question No.3: Was Kyle Athay negligent, and if so, was this negligence a proximate 
cause of his own injuries? 
Answer to Question No.3: Yes L..J NolJU 
Question No.4: Was Daryl Ervin negligent, and if so was his negligence a proximate 
cause of the Kyle Athay's injuries? 
Answer to Question No.4: Yes L2(J NoL..J 
If you answered "Yes" to either or both of questions 3 and 4, answer Question No.5. If 
you answered "No" to both Questions 3 and 4, then skip to Question No.6. 
Instruction for Question No.5: You will reach this question if you have found that the 
Sheriff Dale Stacey acted with reckless disregard and either or both Kyle Athay and 
Daryl Ervin were negligent, which reckless disregard and negligence caused the injuries 
to Kyle Athay. In this question, you are to apportion the fault between these parties in 
terms of a percentage. As to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" to 
questions 2, 3, and 4, determine the percentage of fault for that party or entity, and enter 
the percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to any of the above 
questions, insert a "0" or "Zero" as to that party or entity. Your total percentages must 
equal 100%. 
Question No.5: \Vhat is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the 
follO\ving: 
Sheriff Dale Stacey, agent of Rich County, 
Kyle Athay 
Daryl Ervin 
Total must equal 100% 
If the percentage of fault you assigned to the Kyle Athay is equal to or greater than the 
percentage of fault you assigned to the Rich County, Utah, you are done. Sign the verdict 
and advise the Bailiff. If the percentage of fault assigned to Kyle Athay is less than the 
percentage of fault you assigned to Sheriff Dale Stacey, agent of Rich County, answer the 
next question. 
Question No.6: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the Kyle Athay as a 
result of the accident? 
Answer to Question No.6: We assess Kyle Athay's damages as follows: 
1. Economic damages, as defined in the Instructions: 
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Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my instructions 
to those facts, and in this way to decide of your own opinion of what the law is or should 
be, or what either side may state the law to be. You must consider them as a whole, not 
picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which the instructions are given has 
no significance as to their relative importance. The law requires that your decision be 
made solely upon the evidence before you. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should 
influence you in your deliberations. Faithful performance by you of these duties is vital 
the administration of justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this 
trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and 
received, and any stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in Court is 
governed by rules of law. At times during the trial, an objection may be made to a 
question asked a witness, or to a witness' answer, or to an exhibit. This simply means 
that I am being asked to decide a particular rule of law. Arguments on the admissibility 
of evidence are designed to aid the Court and are not to be considered by you nor affect 
your deliberations. If I sustain an objection to a question or to an exhibit, the witness 
may not answer the question or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not attempt to 
guess what the answer might have been or what the exhibit might have shown. Similarly, 
if I tell you not to consider a particular statement or exhibit you should put it out of your 
mind, and not refer to it or rely on it in your later deliberations. 
During the trial I may have to talk with the parties about the rules of law which 
should apply in this case. Sometimes we will talk here at the bench. At other times I will 
excuse you from the courtroom so that you can be comfortable while we work out any 
/ </1 
problems. You are not to speculate about any such discussions. They are necessary from 
time to time and help the trial run more smoothly. 
Some of you have probably heard the terms "circumstantial evidence," "direct 
evidence" and "hearsay evidence." Do not be concerned with these terms. You are to 
consider all the evidence admitted in this trial. 
However, the law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the sole 
judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what weight you 
attach to it. 
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring 
with you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your 
everyday affairs you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and 
how much weight you attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use 
in your everyday dealings in making these decisions are the considerations which you 
should apply in your deliberations. 
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because more 
witnesses may have testified one way than the other. Your role is to think about the 
testimony of each witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what the 
witness had to say. 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion 
on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consider 
the qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for the opinion. 
You are not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it 
entitled. 
INSTRUCTION NO.2 
If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am 
inclined to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be 
influenced by any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I 
intend to intimate, any opinion as to which witnesses are or not worthy of belief, what 
facts are or are not established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If 
any expression of mine seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I 
instruct you to disregard it. 
/51 
INSTRUCTION NO.3 
There are certain things you must not do during this trial: 
1. You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the 
attorneys or their employees, or any of the witnesses. 
2. You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to 
discuss the case with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the cause with 
you, or to influence your decision in the case, you must report it to me 
promptly. 
3 . You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the 
jury room to deliberate in the close of the entire case. 
4. You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the 
testimony and have received my instructions as to the law that applies 
to the case. 
5 . You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater 
understanding of the case. 
6. You must not go to the place where any alleged even occurred. 
INSTRUCTION NO.4 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions 
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into 
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby 
diverted from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and 
not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial. 
/5:3 
INSTRUCTION NO.5 
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I 




INSTRUCTION NO 6 
In this case the Plaintiff, Kyle Athay, claims that these are the facts: That on June 
10, 1999, Dale Stacey, Sheriff of Rich County, Utah, began pursuing Daryl Ervin near 
Randolph, Utah and continued to pursue him until Ervin collided with the Plaintiff, 
seriously injuring him. Thus, the Plaintiff seeks recovery for his damages. 
INSTRUCTION NO.7 
Plaintiff Kyle Athay claims that Rich County, Utah, is liable for the damages the 
Plaintiff allegedly suffered as a result of a vehicle collision between Kyle Athay and 
Daryl Ervin on June 10, 1999, while Mr. Ervin was being pursued by Sheriff Stacey and 
Bear Lake County Deputies Gregg Athay and Chad Ludwig. 
In defense, Rich County claims it is not liable because Sheriff Stacey acted with 
the appropriate level of care during the relevant incident and because Sheriff Stacey's 
conduct was not a proximate cause of Plaintiff's alleged damages. Defendant further 
claims that the incident was caused solely or partially by the recklessness of Daryl Ervin, 
and may have been cause by the negligence of others. 
Additionally, Rich County claims that if Sheriff Stacey's conduct is found to be 
reckless, this conduct falls outside the scope of Stacey's employment with Rich County 
and thus Rich County cannot be held liable for any injuries proximately cause by 
Stacey's recklessness. 
This instruction is not intended to be a statement of facts nor what the evidence in 
this case has shown, but rather it is merely a summary by the Court of the respective 
claims made by the parties in this case. 
:f1l.Hj In sir 
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INSTRUCTION NO.8 
I have previously instructed you that this accident occurred on June 10, 1999. 
The date of the accident and the length of time that has elapsed since it occurred is not 
something for you to speculate about or to concern yourself with as you hear the evidence 
and deliberate. All civil cases take time to get to trial and you are not to attach any 
significance to the fact that. this case is now going to trial and the event in question 
occurred in 1999. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.1 
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this 
case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to 
those facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a 
rational and objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or 
prejudice. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it 
is your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, 
not picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given 
or the manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of 
them. If you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the 
bailiff, and I will try to clarify or explain the point further. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. 
This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, 
and any stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may 
help you tmderstand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. 
If an attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the 
trial, I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to 
an offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rnlings are legal matters, and are 
solely my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which 
was made, or my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a 
question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. 
Remember, a question is not evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to 
the answer. 
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the 
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark 
be stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your 
minds. In your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it 
as though you had never heard it. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course 
of the trial. As the sale judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you 
believe and what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this 
courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. There is no magical 
formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves 
whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to what you are 
told. The considerations you use in making the more important decisions in your 




During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions 
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into 
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby 
diverted from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and 
not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the triaL 
INSTRUCTION NO.3 
Certain evidence was presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony 
taken under oath before the trial and preserved in writing. This evidence is entitled to the 
same consideration you would give had the witness testified from the witness stand. 
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of the 
testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be available to you during your 
deliberations. 
INSTRUCTION NO.4 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantiaL Direct evidence is evidence that 
directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by 
proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the 
degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is 
respected for such convincing force as it may carry. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion of a witness to be 
received as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. A 
person who, by education, study and experience, has become an expert in an art, science or 
profession, and who is called as a witness, may give his opinion as to any such matter in 
which he is versed and which is material to the case. You should consider such expert 
opinion and should weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by 
such an opinion. Give it the weight which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or 
slight, and you may reject it, if in your judgment the reasons given for it are unsound. 
INSTRUCTION NO.6 
In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. I called your 
attention to this when the evidence was admitted. I remind you that whenever evidence was 
admitted for a limited purpose, you must not consider such evidence for any purpose other 
than the limited purpose for which it was admitted. 
INSTRUCTION NO.7 
Rich County, Utah is the Defendant in tills case and is a county in the State of Utah. 
Rich County is entitled to the same fair and unprejudiced treatment that an individual would 
be under like circumstances. You should decide this case with the same impartiality that you 
would use in deciding a case between individuals. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
You are instructed that Sheriff Dale Stacey, Deputy Sheriff Gregg Athay, Deputy 
Sheriff Chad Ludwig and Bear Lake County are not parties to tIus action. You are not to 
speculate or consider in your deliberations the disposition of any claims associated with 
Bear Lake County and/or Deputy Sheriffs Gregg Athay or Chad Ludwig, or Sheriff Dale 
Stacey. You should consider only the case as it relates to Rich County, Utah. 
INSTRUCTION NO.9 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the 
expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the 
proposition is more probably true than not true. 
Ita 1 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use 
ordinary care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" 
mean the care a reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those 
shown by the evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a 
reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person 
would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does 
not say how a reasonably careful person would act under those circumstances. That is for 
you to decide. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the occurrence 
in question which provided that: 
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or 
any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol drugs 
and/or any other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol 
concentration of 0.08 or more as shown by analysis of his blood, urine or 
breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this 
state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private 
property open to the public. 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
There was a certain statute in force in the state ofIdaho at the time of the occurrence 
in question which provided that: 
Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully flees or attempts to elude a 
pursing police vehicle when given a visual or audible signal to bring the 
vehicle to a stop ... and while so doing: 
(a) Travels in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour above the posted speed 
limit; 
(b) Causes damage to the property of another or bodily injury to another; 
(c) Drives his vehicle in a manner as to endanger or likely to endanger 
the property of another or the person of another; or 
(d) Leaves the state; 
is guilty of a felony. 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
/1a 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the occurrence 
in question which provided that: 
No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable 
and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and 
potential hazards then existing. Consistent with the foregoing, every 
person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed when approaching 
and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing, when 
approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hillcrest, 
when traveling upon any narrow or winding highway, and when 
special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by 
reason of weather or highway conditions. 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
11/ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the occurrence 
in question which provided that: 
Ins 
No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede 
the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced speed 
is necessary for safe operation or in compliance 'with the law. 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
/7~ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the occurrence 
in question which provided that: 
(1) Upon all highways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon 
the right half ofthe roadway except as follows: 
*** 
(b) When an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of 
the center of the highway. Any person doing so shall yield the right-of-
way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed 
portion of the highway within a distance as to constitute an immediate 
hazard; 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
1,3 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the occurrence 
in question which provided that: 
(1) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency or police 
vehicle making use of an audible or visible signal ... the driver of every 
other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and immediately drive to a 
position parallel to, and as close as possible to, the nearest edge or curb of 
the highway lawful for parking and clear of any intersection, and stop and 
remain in that position until the authorized emergency or police vehicle 
has passed, except when otherwise directed by a peace officer. 
(2) This section shall not operate to relieve the driver of an authorized 
emergency or police vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the 
safety of all persons using the highway. 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
(1) The driver of an authorized emergency or police vehicle may exercise the 
privileges set forth below, when responding to an emergency call, or when in the pursuit of 
an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to a fire alarm. When 
necessary to warn, the vehicle being operated at the time must make use of an audible signal 
having a decibel rating of at least one hundred (100) at a distance of ten (10) feel and/or 
display a flashing light visible in a 360 degree arc at a distance of one thousand (1,000) feet, 
under nOlmal atmospheric conditions. 
(2) Under the above circumstances, the driver may: 
(a) Park or stand, irrespective of the parking or standing 
provision of law; 
(b) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only 
after slovving dovm as may be necessary for safe operation; 
(c) Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does 
not endanger life or property; 
(d) Disregard regulations govemmg direction of 
movement or turning in specified directions. 
(3) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized 
emergency or police vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the 
safety of all persons, nor shall these provisions protect the driver from the 
consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
A person acts with reckless disregard if the person's conduct creates an unreasonable 
risk of bodily harm, and the person actually perceives the high degree of probability that 
harm will result and he continues in his course of conduct 
Actual knowledge of the high degree of probability that harm will result does not 
require knowledge of the actual person or persons at risk or the exact manner in which they 
would be hanned. It only requires knowledge of the high degree of probability of the kind of 
harm that the injured party suffered. 
/nsi1-
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause 
the damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if 
the inj}1fY, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway_ 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent 
conduct and/or reckless disregard of two or more persons or entities contribute concurrently 
as substantial factors in bringing about an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate 
cause of the injury regardless of the extent to which each contributes to the injury. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
The term "agent" refers to a person authorized by another, called the "principal," to 
act for or in the place of the principal. The principal is responsible for any act of the agent 
within the agent's scope of authority. 
/70 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
Conduct is Virithin the scope of the agent's authority if it occurs while the agent is 
engaged in the duties that the agent was asked or expected to perfonn and relates to those 
duties. It is not necessary that a particular act or failure to act be expressly authorized by the 
principal to bring it within the scope of the agent's authority. Conduct for the benefit of the 
principal that is incidental to, customarily connected with, or reasonably necessary for the 
perfonnance of such duties is within the scope of the agent's authority. 
179 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
The plaintiff has the burden of proof on the following proposition: 
1. That Sheriff Dale Stacey's conduct on June 10, 1999 was within the scope of his 
authority as an agent of Rich County, Utah. 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that this proposition has been 
proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If you find from your consideration of 
all the evidence that this proposition has not been proved, then you should answer this 
question "no." 
J~O 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
The plaintiff, Kyle Athay, has the burden of proof on each the following 
propositions: 
1. That Sheriff Dale Stacey acted with reckless disregard. 
2. That the Kyle Athay was injured. 
3. That the conduct of Sheriff Dale Stacey amounting to reckless disregard was a 
proximate cause of the injury to Kyle Athay. 
4. The elements of damage and the amounts thereof. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Did Sheriff Dale Stacey act with reckless disregard, and if so, was the reckless 
disregard a proximate cause of the injuries to Kyle Athay? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these 
propositions has been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find 
that any of these propositions has not been proved, then Kyle Athay 
of proof required and you should answer this question ''No.'' 
/nstr 
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not met the burden 
INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
In this case, the defendant, Rich County, has alleged that Kyle Athay was negligent. 
On this defense, Rich County has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. The Kyle Athay was negligent. 
2. TIle negligence of Kyle Athay was a proximate cause ofllis own injuries. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict fonn: 
Was the Kyle Athay negligent, and if so was Kyle Athay's negligence a proximate 
cause oflus injuries? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these 
propositions has not been proved, then the Rich COlmty has not met the burden of proof 
required and you should answer this question "No." 
/ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 24(a) 
In this case, the defendant has alleged that Daryl Ervin an indivIdual not a party to 
this lawsuit, was negligent. On this defense, the defendant has the burden of proof on each 
of the following propositions: 
1. That Daryl Ervin was negligent. 
2. The negligence of Daryl Ervin was a proximate cause of Kyle Athay's injuries. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Was Daryl Ervin negligent, and if so was Daryl Ervin's negligence a proximate 
cause of the plaintiff's injuries? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these 
propositions has been proved, you should answer the question "Yes." However, if you find 
that any of these propositions has not been proved, then Rich County has not met the burden 
of proof required and you should answer this question "No." 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion 
as to whether Kyle Athay is entitled to damages. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 26 
If the jury decides Kyle Athay is entitled to recover from Rich County, the jury must 
detem1ine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate Kyle Athay for 
any damages proved to be proximately caused by the reckless disregard of Rich County's 
agent Sheriff Dale Stacey. 
The elements of damage the jury may consider are: 
A. Non-economic damages 
1. The nature of the injuries; 
2. The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future; 
3. The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities; 
4. The disfigurement caused by the injuries; 
5. The aggravation caused to any preexisting condition. 
B. Economic damages 
1. The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses 
incurred as a result of the injury and the present cash value of medical care and expenses 
reasonably certain and necessary to be required in the future; 
2. The reasonable value of the past earnings lost as a result of the injury; 
3. The present cash value of the future earning capacity lost because of the 
injury, taking into consideration the earning power, age, health, life expectancy, mental and 
physical abilities, habits, and disposition of Kyle Athay, and any other circumstances shown 
by the evidence. 
4. The reasonable value of necessary services provided by another in doing 
things for Kyle Athay, which, except for the injury, Kyle Athay would ordinarily have 
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performed and the present cash value of such services reasonably certain to be required in 
the future; 
Whether Kyle Athay has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
A person who has a pre,existing condition or disability is entitled to recover 
damages for the aggravation of such preexisting condition, if any, that is proximately caused 
by the occurrence. The person is not entitled to recover damages for the pre-existing 
condition or disability itself. 
If you find that before the occurrence causing the injuries in this case Kyle Athay 
had a preexisting bodily condition or disability, and further find that because of the new 
occurrence in this case the pre-existing condition or disability was aggravated, then you 
should consider the aggravation of the condition or disability in fixing the damages in this 
case. You should not consider any condition or disability that existed prior to the 
occurrence, or any aggravation of such condition that was not caused or contributed to by 
reason of this occurrence. 
You are to apportion, if possible, between the condition or disability prior to this 
occurrence and the condition or disability caused by this occurrence, and assess liability 
accordingly. If no apportionment can reasonably be made by you, then Rich County, Utah 
is liable for the entire damage. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that may accrue in the 
future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid now which, \vhen invested at a 
reasonable rate of interest, would be sufficient to pay the future damages at the time and in 
the amount the future damages will be incurred. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 29 
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to lIlinhJJize the 
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such 
care cannot be recovered. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
Under a standard table of mortality, the life expectancy of a male age 37 is 77 years. 
This fignre is not conclusive. It is an actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining 
length of life based upon statistical samples of death rates and ages at death in this country. 
This data may be considered in connection with all other evidence relating to the probable 
life expectancy, including the subject's occupation, health, habits, and other activities. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 31 
In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. 
This form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict 
form to you now. 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Question No.1: Was Sheriff Dale Stacey's conduct on June 10, 1999 within in the scope 
of his authority as an agent of Rich County, Utah? 
Answer to Question No.1: Yes No~ 
Question No.2: Did Sheriff Dale Stacey's conduct amount to reckless disregard, and if 
so, was this reckless disregard a proximate cause of Kyle Athay's injuries? 
Answer to Question No.2: Yes Ll No 
If you answered "No," to either question 1 or 2 you are done. Sign the verdict as 
instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the 
next question. 
Question No. Was Kyle Athay negligent, and if so, was this negligence a proximate 
cause of his own injuries? 
Answer to Question No.3: Yes [~ Nor~ 
Question No.4: Was Daryl Ervin negligent, and if so was his negligence a proximate 
cause of the Kyle Athay's injuries? 
Answer to Question No.4: Yes ~ Nor~ 
If you answered "Yes" to either or both of questions 3 and 4, answer Question No.5. If 
you answered "No" to both Questions 3 and 4, then skip to Question No.6. 
Instruction for Question No.5: You will reach this question if you have found that the 
Sheriff Dale Stacey acted with reckless disregard and either or both Kyle Athay and 
Daryl Ervin were negligent, which reckless disregard and negligence caused the injuries 
to Kyle Athay. In this question, you are to apportion the fault between these parties in 
terms of a percentage. As to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" to 
questions 2, 3, and 4, determine the percentage of fault for that party or entity, and enter 
the percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to any of the above 
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\\That is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the 
Sheriff Dale Stacey, agent of Rich County, 
Kyle Athay 
Daryl Ervin 





If the percentage of fault you assigned to the Kyle Athay is equal to or greater than the 
percentage of fault you assigned to the Rich County, Utah, you are done. Sign the verdict 
and advise the Bailiff. If the percentage of fault assigned to Kyle Athay is less than the 
percentage of fault you assigned to Sheriff Dale Stacey, agent of Rich County, answer the 
next question. 
Question No.6: \\That is the total amount of damage sustained by the Kyle Athay as a 
result of the accident? 
Answer to Question 6: We assess Kyle Athay's damages as follows: 
1. Economic damages, as defined in the Instructions: 
Non-economic damages, as defined in the Instructions: 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 32 
In deciding iliis case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to anoilier or 
decide any question by chance, such as by ilie flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money 
damages are to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in 
advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining 
the amount of the damage award or percentage of fault. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who \vill 
preside over your deliberations. 
An appropriate foml of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. 
Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by 
the instructions on the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon 
as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, 
you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine 
agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if 
nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, 
who will then return you into open court. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 34 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you 
regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In 
a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you v,rill retire to 
the jury room for your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the 
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the 
outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of 
opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the 
beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that 
position, even if shown that it is -wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, 
but you are judges. For you, a'> for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment 
and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's Vlews. Deliberate with the 
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a 
discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 35 
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate 'With me, you may 
send a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate 
with me by any means other than such a note. 
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on 
any of the questions before you, numerically or othervvise, unless requested to do so by me. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 36 
You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged with 
the sincere thanks of this Court. You may now discuss this case with the attorneys or with 
anyone else. For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to 
anyone else, is entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you 
want to, but you are not required to do so, and you may choose not to discuss the case with 
anyone at all. If you choose to talk to someone about this case, you may tell them as much 
or as little as you like about your deliberations or the facts that influenced your decisions. If 
anyone persists in discussing the case over your objection, or becomes critical of your 
service, either before or after any discussion has begun, you may report it to me. 
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The jury must first determine that Sheriff Dale Stacey's conduct amounted to reckless 
disregard; if the answer to that question is yes, then the jury must make a separate finding 
that Sheriff Stacey's conduct, amounting to reckless disregard, was a proximate cause of 
Kyle Athay's injuries. 

I encourage you to continue to deliberate, continue to read the instructions, and review 
the evidence. I would direct your attention to the admonishment of the Court contained in 
instruction #34. 
\ 
The Court would refer you back to jury instruction #33 and the language in the 3rd 
paragraph. In answering the specific question asked, there must be at least nine of you 
agree on each question, before moving to the next question, if the Special Verdict r orm 
requires you to do so. Each question answered, does not have to be answered by the same 
nine or more jurors. Vv'hichever question is the last question on the form that you are 
going to answer, the nine or more who agreed on that question are the nine who shall sign 
the verdict form. 
